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Research on the perception of biological human motion shows that people are able
to infer emotional states by observing body movements. This article reviews the
methodology applied in fMRI research on the neural representation of such emotion
perception. Specifically, we ask how different stimulus qualities of bodily expressions,
individual emotional valence, and task instructions may affect the neural representation
of an emotional scene. The review demonstrates the involvement of a variety of brain
areas, thereby indicating how well the human brain is adjusted to navigate in multiple
social situations. All stimulus categories (i.e., full-light body displays, point-light displays,
and avatars) can induce an emotional percept and are associated with increased
activation in an extensive neural network. This network seems to be organized around
areas belonging to the so-called action observation network (PMC, IFG, and IPL) and
the mentalizing network (TPJ, TP, dmPFC, and lOFC) as well as areas processing body
form and motion (e.g., EBA, FBA, and pSTS). Furthermore, emotion-processing brain
sites such as the amygdala and the hypothalamus seem to play an important role
during the observation of emotional body expressions. Whereas most brain regions
clearly display an increased response to emotional body movements in general, some
structures respond selectively to negative valence. Moreover, neural activation seems
to depend on task characteristics, indicating that certain structures are activated even
when attention is shifted away from emotional body movements.
Keywords: emotion, emotion recognition, body movements, fMRI, point-light displays, AON, mentalizing
INTRODUCTION
As social beings, we spend the major part of our time interacting with others. Therefore, it is
important for us to recognize and properly assess our conspecifics’ emotions so that we can respond
to them appropriately. This is advantageous, because it enables us to approach people who seem to
be in a good mood while avoiding contact with those who are angry, threatening, or dangerous.
Emotions can be transmitted via very different channels. Most research on emotion perception
and processing has focused on emotions expressed via facial expression and/or prosody. However,
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these emotional channels are not the only source of input
conveying emotionally relevant information. Another important
human-emotion-expressing system that plays a central role in
person recognition has come into the spotlight in recent years:
the human body; that is, body language and body movements (de
Gelder, 2006; de Gelder et al., 2014). Human body movements
can convey emotions, and observers can infer the emotional state
of individuals or interacting partners from such movements even
when these are still at a distance and their faces are not clearly
visible (Michalak et al., 2009, 2011; Lorey et al., 2012; Kaletsch
et al., 2014b,a). Furthermore, because emotions are closely linked
to actions (Frijda, 1986), the bodily expression of an emotion
can act as a direct cue as to what might serve as an adequate
behavioral response (de Gelder, 2006; de Gelder and Hortensius,
2014).
On a neural level, research has demonstrated that the
perception of emotional bodily expressions is linked not only to
the activation of areas important for emotional processing such
as the amygdala (Hadjikhani and de Gelder, 2003), but also to
action representations and motor responses (de Gelder et al.,
2004; for reviews, see de Gelder, 2006; de Gelder et al., 2010). This
underpins the important linkage between emotions and adequate
(re-) actions (Frijda, 1986; Panksepp, 1998).
The paradigms applied to investigate the perception of
emotional body movements and the underlying neural substrate
differ widely. However, what all paradigms have in common is
that they present emotional body movements while excluding
facial information and other distracting variables. Nonetheless,
the stimulus material applied in research varies substantially with
respect to the available information on the observed moving
body, thereby providing different advantages and supporting
different research perspectives. For example, point-light displays
(PLDs) provide only kinematic information stemming from just a
few points representing the joints of the body (Johansson, 1973).
This ensures that perception is not affected by confounding
variables in the stimulus material such as attractiveness,
sympathy, and cultural aspects (Hoffmann et al., 2010). An avatar,
however, provides further information on the shape of a moving
body as well as depth cues, thereby creating a more complex
percept and approximating the natural richness of emotional
interactions.
Against this background, the present review examines the
common methodology in the research field addressing perception
of emotional body movements. We have chosen to describe
results from studies using moving stimuli (i.e., full-light displays,
PLDs, and avatars) because our theoretical focus lies on the
perceived and represented differences between the different
categories of moving human body stimuli that possess emotional
content. We believe that whether the observer views static
whole-body images or bodies in movement makes a qualitative
difference because, as, for example, Atkinson et al. (2004)
have stated, it is especially the perceived intensity of body
gestures that relies more on movement than on static form
information. Against this background, our aim is to analyze
research that offers insight into the neural representation of
the perception of emotional states derived from kinematic and
bodily cues of biological (human) motion. We discuss how
emotional movement stimuli of different quality may modulate
the underlying neural substrate of the observer’s perception.
We further ask how depicted emotional valence (negative vs.
positive) as well as different task instructions (implicit vs. explicit
paradigms) might affect perception and its neural processing.
LITERATURE SEARCH
We identified and selected relevant studies (for selection process,
see Figure 1) by searching in PubMed, Google Scholar, and Web
of Science. We used several key terms in different variations,
for instance fMRI, fNIRS, emotional brain, emotion, perception,
point-light displays, body expressions, dynamic body, neural
representation, body parts, biological motion, avatars, motion
capture, emotional body language, kinematics, and emotion
recognition. We then selected potential studies by examining
their abstracts. Additionally, we scanned references retrieved
from the selected literature for further articles on the topic. We
included studies when (1) emotional body movements were used
as stimulus material (i.e., full-light displays of whole bodies or
body parts, point-light displays, avatars), (2) task requirements
included emotion judgments or observation of emotional body
movements, and (3) fMRI or fNIRS were used to assess brain
activity. Based on these criteria, we selected a total of 16 studies
for our review.
THE NEUROPHYSIOLOGY OF
PERCEIVING EMOTIONS FROM
EMOTIONAL BODY MOVEMENTS
Neuroimaging studies on the perception of emotional body
movements investigate the brain structures that play a key role
not only in perception per se but also during the processes of
emotion classification, valence judgments, and social perception
in response to such movements.
Regarding the observation of human actions, the last two
decades have seen the accumulation of a broad body of
neuroimaging studies assessing the brain networks underlying
the respective observation processes. One widely discussed
underlying neural substrate of human action observation abilities
is the so-called action observation network (AON). This is
supposed to play a crucial role when observing the actions of
others (for a meta-analysis, see Caspers et al., 2010). The AON
embraces all brain areas activated by the mere observation of
actions. According to a meta-analysis of 104 studies, enhanced
activation during the observation of human actions is found in
the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), the dorsal and ventral premotor
cortex (dPMC, vPMC), the supplementary motor area (SMA),
the inferior parietal lobe (IPL), the superior parietal lobe (SPL),
and the primary sensory cortex (SI) (Caspers et al., 2010). The
AON is believed to integrate the observed actions of others
with an individual’s personal motor repertoire. This suggests that
the human brain understands actions by engaging in a motor
simulation based on its own motor programs (Kilner et al., 2007).
However, it has been asserted that understanding actions and
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FIGURE 1 | PRISMA flow diagram of literature selection. Adapted from Moher et al. (2009).
their associated intentions cannot be purely motoric in nature.
In addition, mental states such as a person’s feelings, emotions,
and desires are attributed to other people in order to understand
the intentions underlying their actions (Frith and Frith, 2003). In
this regard, Frith and Frith (2006) have suggested that simulating
motor or affective processes is only the first step toward inferring
the other’s intentions and attitudes. Another process has been
described as a mentalizing process or the employment of a
“theory of mind” (ToM). This can be conceived as inferring
another person’s mental state, and it is thought to be subserved
primarily by four brain regions: the ventromedial prefrontal
cortex (vmPFC), the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), the
precuneus, and the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) (Centelles
et al., 2011). Further structures such as the anterior superior
temporal sulci (aSTS), the lateral orbitofrontal cortex (lOFC), and
the amygdala may also play a major role (Gallagher and Frith,
2003; Saxe, 2006; Frith, 2007; Bedny et al., 2009; Carrington and
Bailey, 2009). Turning to the processing of human body form,
further regions are thought to be involved in processing human
body movements. These include the extra striate body area (EBA)
and the fusiform body area (FBA). Both have been reported to
respond selectively to human bodies and body parts (Downing
et al., 2001; Schwarzlose et al., 2005).
In the following sections, we present neuroimaging research
based on the observation and valuation of emotional body
movements. More precisely, we discuss three different stimulus
types of emotional body movements—namely, full-light displays
(videos), PLDs, and avatars. Hence, the main focus of the current
review is on the underlying neural substrate of the processing of
emotional body movements and the possible modulatory effects
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of different stimulus categories. Furthermore, we discuss the
influence of stimulus valences (e.g., angry, fearful, happy) on
brain sites that are mostly valence-independent as well as on
sites that react preferentially to specific valences. In a last step,
we discuss effects of different task instructions (e.g., implicit vs.
explicit tasks) on neural activation.
Stimulus Types
Full-Light Displays
Research on emotional body movements has frequently applied
full-light displays of emotional body movements as stimuli.
Although many studies have shown that emotional expressions
can indeed be identified from the minimal kinematic information
provided by, for instance, PLDs, Atkinson et al. (2004) have
shown that the use of full-light displays leads to slightly better
recognition accuracy rates for the specific emotional content.
To construct stimuli, most studies asked non-professional or
professional actors to enact different scenarios corresponding
to emotional situations such as opening a door and reacting
to someone or something that makes them angry (Pichon
et al., 2008). Compared to more abstract displays of biological
movements, this method clearly has greater ecological validity.
However, it is harder to control and is therefore more susceptible
to possible confounding factors such as the attractiveness of
or sympathy toward the actor. Nonetheless, facial features and
expressions are commonly removed and clothing is kept uniform
(Grèzes et al., 2007) to ensure that these variables do not exert
unwanted effects.
Neural correlates of observing full-light displays
Studies using full-light displays to investigate how emotional
body movements are represented on a neural level have found
an involvement of various structures across the brain (Figure 2).
This network revolves around structures that code basal inputs
such as form information and motor dynamics, but also ones on a
higher cognitive level that evaluate the significance and meaning
of actions as well as the intention behind the action.
Action observation network
Full-light displays of emotional movements activate several
structures that are thought to be part of the AON. These include
the inferior parietal lobule (IPL) and the inferior frontal gyrus
(IFG) that both show increased activation for actions containing
emotional expressions when contrasted directly with neutral
actions (Sinke et al., 2010). Comparisons of the observation of
emotional actions with the observation of neutral actions have
also revealed increased activation within the premotor cortex
(PMC), thereby indicating that this area also exhibits a particular
sensitivity for emotional body movements (Grèzes et al., 2007;
Pichon et al., 2008; Sinke et al., 2010). This involvement of
AON-associated structures suggests that observing emotional
movements might be mediated by a mental simulation process
that draws on own motor representations of such movements in
order to make sense of them. In this context, it is worth noting
that a recent study by Jospe et al. (2018) has emphasized that
this simulation process correlates with personality traits such as
individual empathy levels. Their results showed that participants
FIGURE 2 | Brain structures preferentially recruited by emotional (vs. neutral)
body movements. Generic figure; upper image shows left hemisphere view.
Increased surface transparency for visibility of subcortical structures (i.e.,
amygdala, hypothalamus). AON (yellow), action observation network; includes
PMC, premotor cortex; IFG, inferior frontal gyrus; IPL, inferior parietal lobule;
mentalizing network (green) includes lOFC, lateral orbitofrontal cortex;
dmPFC, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex; TPJ, temporoparietal junction; TP,
temporal pole; form and motion associated areas (red) include pSTS,
posterior superior temporal sulcus; EBA, extra striate body area; FBA,
fusiform body area. Structures associated with affective significance and
defensive reactions (purple) include AMG, amygdala; HTH, hypothalamus.
Lower part of the image presents sagittal sections of the left hemisphere with
each structure presented at least once.
with high empathy scores utilize the embodiment or simulation
process more optimally than participants with low empathy
scores.
The role of the mentalizing network
As stated above, although the AON is thought to be at
the core of understanding another person’s actions, the
process of inferring the meaning behind actions has also
been associated with so-called mentalizing processes (Frith
and Frith, 2006). Within this framework, structures that
commonly show an increased activation in response to emotional
body movements compared to neutral actions include the
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temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) and the temporal pole (TP)
(Pichon et al., 2008, 2009; Sinke et al., 2010). The TPJ is thought
to be involved in reorienting processes, but has also been found to
be active during mentalizing tasks and higher cognitive tasks such
as perspective taking (Frith and Frith, 2006; Krall et al., 2015). It
has been suggested that the temporal pole is a convergence zone
in which knowledge from different modalities is integrated. For
instance, knowledge about a person can be used to predict not
only thoughts, feelings, and behavior that are most likely to occur
within a given situation and vice versa, but also how moment-to-
moment changes of a situation can alter these thoughts, feelings,
and behavior (Frith and Frith, 2006). In this context, it is assumed
that activation of the TP allows the observer to integrate the
emotional behavior with the situational context in order to gain a
meaningful understanding of it.
A more frontal region belonging to the mentalizing network,
the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), has also repeatedly been
found to be activated in persons observing and subsequently
rating emotional body movements in terms of their emotional
valence (e.g., neutral or angry) (Pichon et al., 2008, 2009, 2011;
Sinke et al., 2010). The mPFC is considered to be associated with
anticipating what another person is thinking or feeling. It has also
been shown to be active when thinking about one’s own mental
state. It is therefore postulated that the mPFC is used to interpret
what a person is likely to be feeling in a given situation (Frith and
Frith, 1999).
Finally, increased activation of the lateral orbitofrontal cortex
(lOFC) is found in response to the observation of emotional (vs.
neutral) body movements (Pichon et al., 2008, 2009, 2011; Sinke
et al., 2010; Van den Stock et al., 2011). Activation of the lOFC
has also been associated with mentalizing and particularly with
ToM processes (Völlm et al., 2006) as well as with comparing
non-matching social-emotional cues (i.e., social violations) with
stored representations (Moll et al., 2005).
Hence, the mentalizing network seems to be responsive
toward emotional content when judging dynamic movements.
Considering the simultaneous involvement of AON-associated
structures, the increased sensitivity of the mentalizing network
to emotional actions supports the idea that they serve a common
purpose—that is, to infer and interpret affective states from body
movements.
Areas encoding motion and form information
One further structure that is believed to be critical in decoding
human motion (Blake and Shiffrar, 2007) is the (posterior)
superior temporal sulcus (pSTS). In addition to its activation
being elicited by human motion per se, the pSTS has also often
been shown to be activated by dynamic emotional expressions
(Grèzes et al., 2007; Pichon et al., 2009, 2011; Kret et al., 2011; Van
den Stock et al., 2011). Moreover, it is worth noting that the pSTS
has frequently been discussed as part of the AON. Urgen et al.
(2016), for instance, pointed out that during the visual processing
of actions, the pSTS pools information from the visual cortex and
passes that information to higher levels of the AON (e.g., the
PMC) that code higher aspects of actions.
Aside from motion information, emotional body movements
also provide form information. Previous research suggests that
the extra striate body area (EBA), located in the posterior
inferior temporal sulcus/middle temporal gyrus, is linked to body
representation in general and responds selectively to emotional
bodies compared to a variety of other objects (Downing et al.,
2001; Peelen et al., 2007).
Moreover, empirical studies have demonstrated a higher
sensitivity of the EBA for emotional compared to neutral body
movements (Grèzes et al., 2007; Peelen et al., 2007; Pichon et al.,
2009; Kret et al., 2011). In this context, it is worth noting that
the fusiform body area (FBA), a structure of the ventral fusiform
gyrus, is also especially sensitive for emotional body movements
compared to neutral body movements (Pichon et al., 2009; Sinke
et al., 2010; Kret et al., 2011).
Hence, brain areas associated with motion and form
processing show increased neural responses especially to
movements with emotional content. It has been proposed that
this is an outcome of the modulation by another brain structure—
namely, the amygdala (Pichon et al., 2009).
Affective significance and action preparation
When observing emotional body movements, it is important
to be able to judge the respective affective significance of
the observed movement in order to know how to respond
appropriately. This process is believed to be conducted by
the amygdala, a structure that is also tightly connected with
structures that play a pivotal role in defense reactions and
action preparation such as the hypothalamus and the PMC
(Barbas et al., 2003). Seeking support for this idea, Sinke
et al. (2010) investigated whether small differences in body
movements (i.e., threatening vs. teasing body movements) would
lead to differential brain activation. Their results showed that
threatening stimuli elicited greater amygdala and hypothalamus
activation than teasing stimuli. This suggests that when a stimulus
is evaluated as potentially threatening, this information is passed
on to structures that modulate vegetative preparedness such as
the hypothalamus (Sinke et al., 2010).
An extensive network recruited by full-light displays
To conclude, studies using full-light displays show that emotion
perception from body movements is associated with increased
activation in a broad network of cortical and subcortical areas.
Moreover, this activation involves numerous subprocesses. While
being composed of basal processes such as recognizing human
form and motion, it is also associated with structures such as
the EBA, the FBA, and the pSTS along with higher cognitive
processes such as assigning meaning to what has been observed
(IPL, IFG, and PM). Moreover, a related process of making sense
of the movement observed is to recognize the intention of the
person carrying out the movement. These mentalizing processes
are assumed to be carried out mainly by the TPJ, TP, mPFC,
and lOFC. Finally, and not to be neglected, because it plays a
pivotal role in processing emotional movements, evidence reveals
amygdala and hypothalamus activation in response to displays of
emotional body movements (for an overview, see Figure 2).
Point-Light Displays
Back in the early 1970s, Johansson (1973) described a technique
for studying perception from biological motion that reduces
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stimulus information to a minimum. By attaching reflective
patches to several anatomical landmarks and carefully controlling
the light settings, high-intensity signals from the reflective
patches were visible and could be recorded while subjects
performed movements. Nowadays, methods are more advanced,
and using motion capture software to create so-called point-
light displays (PLDs) has become a popular method for assessing
social and emotion perception from biological movements in
both behavioral and fMRI paradigms (Atkinson et al., 2004, 2012;
Heberlein and Saxe, 2005; Lorey et al., 2012). Behavioral studies
have shown a variety of inferences that can be made based on
the observation of PLDs. These include attractiveness, affect, and
vulnerability (Gunns et al., 2002; Provost et al., 2008; Centelles
et al., 2011). Although PLDs may have restricted ecological
validity due to their level of abstraction, the method seems
to be highly suitable for investigating social perception while
eliminating potential confounds in this domain such as gender
and attractiveness.
Neural correlates of observing point-light displays
The evidence base from point-light displays is considerably
smaller than that from the broader body of studies using full-
light displays. In the following, however, we discuss whether a
reduction of visual information, leaving purely kinematic stimuli,
might affect neural activation in the discussed regions of interest
(ROIs).
The action observation network
Because research has been shown that the mere observation
of PLDs without explicit emotional content recruits action
observation networks (Saygin et al., 2004), it is reasonable to
assume that emotional body movements, depicted as PLDs, will
also evoke activity in AON regions. In support of this assumption,
the observation of, among others, emotional PLD interactions
(Centelles et al., 2011) revealed activation in the PMC, and IFG.
Alaerts et al. (2013), for example, carried out fMRI scanning
with typically developed as well autistic individuals while they
were performing an emotion recognition task using PLDs and
a control task in which they observed the same PLDs but were
instructed to direct their attention toward color changes rather
than emotional states. Their results demonstrated that, compared
to fixation, emotion recognition from PLDs activated several
fronto-parietal regions of the AON as well as the IPL. These
data underpin the notion that even after a reduction of visual
information, activation is still elicited in fronto-parietal regions
of the AON subserving action and/or emotion processing as well
as embodied cognition (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004).
The mentalizing network
When inferring affective states from PLDs, it seems that the
mentalizing network also plays a key role, as previously reported
for full-light displays. For example, the TPJ has been identified
repeatedly as being activated by the observation of emotional
PLDs (Heberlein and Saxe, 2005; Centelles et al., 2011). Heberlein
and Saxe (2005), for instance, asked their participants to rate
the fit between an emotion or trait word and a previously
observed point-light video. They found that the TPJ showed
increased activation regardless of whether participants inferred
either affective states or personality traits. Furthermore, the
dorsal part of the mPFC (dmPFC) and the lOFC have also been
found to be activated during the observation of emotional PLD
movements (Heberlein and Saxe, 2005; Centelles et al., 2011),
implying that these regions may not be specifically sensitive to
the reduction of visual information.
In contrast to the literature on full-light displays, the studies
using PLDs reviewed here do not report an increased activation of
the TP. However, this should be interpreted with caution, because
the TP might not have been a predefined ROI in the reviewed
studies. However, on the basis of the evidence discussed in the
present review, we cannot rule out the possibility that the TP is
more sensitive to other stimulus properties such as visual context
and ecological information in full-light displays, and therefore
not activated successfully by point-light displays of emotional
kinematics.
Motion and form information
Although PLDs do not include the same information on shape
such as soft tissue form and motion, they show a similar pattern
of neural activation within, for instance, areas associated with
human body shape and motion. For example, Atkinson et al.
(2012) compared neural responses to emotional (i.e., angry,
happy) and non-emotional actions depicted as PLDs. They found
that all human–motion- and form-information-associated areas
(i.e., EBA; FBA, and pSTS) responded preferentially to emotional
compared to non-emotional PLDs. Within this framework, it
is worth noting that a study investigating neural responses to
various complex motion stimuli showed that the STS reacted
slightly more strongly to videos of humans performing different
whole-body motions than to point-light displays of such motions
(Beauchamp et al., 2003). However, a direct comparison between
emotional full-light displays and PLD movements has yet to be
conducted.
Affective significance and action preparation
Interestingly, no activation has been reported in either the
amygdala or the hypothalamus when comparing emotional PLDs
with neutral stimuli (Heberlein and Saxe, 2005; Centelles et al.,
2011; Atkinson et al., 2012). Both groups of nuclei have been
implicated in motor vigilance to support reflexive defensive
behaviors, typically in response to threatening stimuli portraying,
for example, anger (Pichon et al., 2011). Although the stimuli
used in the present studies included negative emotional displays
and the emotion could be categorized correctly, the lack of
activation in these areas may be due to the level of abstractness
of the stimuli. Another possibility is that predefined regions were
used for the fMRI analyses and further activated regions may have
been missed.
Similar activation pattern elicited by PLDs
Although PLDs contain only a minimum of kinematic
information, studies using PLDs confirm that emotional
point-light body expressions also modulate neural activation
successfully in most of the areas that have previously been
discussed as being relevant for the processing of emotional
movements on the basis of findings using full-light body stimuli.
These areas revolve around structures that are often associated
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with motion and form processing (pSTS, EBA, and FBA), the
AON (IPL, IFG, and PMC), and mentalizing processes (dmPFC,
lOFC, and TPJ). No activation has been reported in the amygdala
and the hypothalamus, indicating that PLDs may not be suited to
elicit defensive responses in the observer. However, it should be
emphasized that most studies analyzed predefined ROIs and this
limits their comparability.
Avatars
Recent years have seen increased interest in a third class of
emotional movement stimuli. Whereas PLDs have been criticized
because their level of abstractness may affect their ecological
validity, full-light displays are restricted in their controllability
with respect to confounding variables such as gender or age
(Goldberg et al., 2015). Therefore, researchers developed an
intermediate stimulus category: dynamic avatars. de Borst and
de Gelder (2015) have argued that avatars may evoke differential
processing (e.g., better discrimination), and this, in turn, may
affect underlying brain activity. Because this is a relatively new
paradigm, the body of neurophysiological research on emotion
perception from avatars is still quite small. However, there are
two studies that have investigated emotion perception by using
avatars within a neurophysiological framework.
Neural correlates of observing avatars
Because only two studies have used paradigms including this
type of stimulus, we decided to summarize their findings without
subdividing this section according to different networks or brain
regions.
Both studies used avatars displaying different emotional gait
patterns (i.e., happy, angry, fearful, sad, or neutral). Participants
were then asked to classify the presented emotional state
during fMRI scanning (Schneider et al., 2014; Goldberg et al.,
2015). Results showed that, in addition to regions previously
associated with form and motion processing (i.e., EBA, FBA,
and pSTS), there was activation within the fusiform face area
(FFA) (Goldberg et al., 2015). The FFA is an area that responds
selectively to faces (Atkinson et al., 2012). This result is quite
surprising, in view of the fact that all avatars were “faceless.”
However, it could suggest that face completion effects may occur
even when detailed facial information is missing (Goldberg et al.,
2015).
Moreover, emotional gait patterns also elicited activation in
two structures of the AON: the IPL and the IFG (Goldberg et al.,
2015). However, no activation in the PMC was reported.
Regarding the mentalizing network, activation was observed
in the TPJ and lOFC, yet no activation was reported in
the dmPFC. Furthermore, emotional (vs. neutral) gait elicited
an increase in activation in the amygdala but not in the
hypothalamus (Goldberg et al., 2015).
Thus, observation of emotional gait patterns of avatars also
elicited increased neural activation in the networks discussed
within the framework of the processing of emotional body
movements. However, it has to be considered that participants
observed emotional gait patterns displayed by avatars instead
of complex interactions or emotional gestures, as described
previously. Therefore, the studies cannot be compared directly
because they used different stimuli. However, the lack of
activation in the PMC and hypothalamus support the notion that,
perhaps, avatars displaying emotional gait are not able to elicit
defensive behaviors in the observer, perhaps to the material’s level
of abstractness.
The Influence of Emotional Valence
The following paragraph describes possible modulatory effects
of different emotional valences on the previously identified
structures that appear to be involved in processing affect
from body movements. Emotional valence means the intrinsic
attractiveness (positive valence) or averseness (negative valence)
of an event, object, or situation (Frijda, 1986). The term can
also be used to characterize and categorize specific emotions. For
example, anger and fear are considered to have negative valence,
whereas joy, for example, has positive valence.
Moreover, it has been discussed whether some structures may
even represent activation in favor of individual emotions (e.g.,
anger and fear) that can, for instance, be assigned to the same
valence category (e.g., negative).
Valence effects
Indeed, several brain structures have been identified as
responding more strongly to certain valences. One of these
structures is the EBA. Schneider et al. (2014) reported that
the EBA was not significantly more activated during the
display of avatars showing a happy gait pattern compared
to neutral gait. In contrast, an increase in activation was
reported for angry, sad, and fearful stimuli (i.e., emotions
with a negative valence) compared to neutral ones. However,
Peelen et al. (2007) did not report such exclusiveness for
negative valence in the EBA, because they found an increased
activation elicited by not only angry, fearful, disgusted body
movements but also happy ones during the observation of
full-light videos. This is in line with Atkinson et al. (2012)
findings reporting enhanced activation in the EBA for angry
as well as happy (vs. neutral) body movements. Schneider
et al. (2014) argued, however, that happy walks were the most
difficult for their participants to identify. Moreover, there was
a slightly positive correlation between recognition accuracy
and activation in the EBA, suggesting that better emotion
recognition was also associated with increased neural activation.
Therefore, they concluded that happy avatar walks may have
lacked emotional expressiveness and therefore failed to induce
a significant increase in cortical activation (Schneider et al.,
2014).
Regarding AON-associated structures, preferential activation
for negative valence was found within the PMC as well as within
the IPL. This effect was revealed by a direct comparison of
threatening (i.e., negative) vs. teasing (i.e., positive) stimuli (Sinke
et al., 2010).
A similar preference for stimuli with a negative valence (anger
and fear vs. neutral stimuli) was found within the TPJ, a region
associated with mentalizing processes (Centelles et al., 2011).
In support of these findings, Schneider et al. (2014) also found
a selectivity of the TPJ for negative stimuli—that is, avatars
displaying an angry, sad, or fearful gait pattern. This is supported
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by a direct contrast between threatening and teasing stimuli
in which threatening stimuli elicited greater activation (Pichon
et al., 2008, 2009).
Differential Activation Between Emotions
of One Valence Category?
Beyond a preferential activation for different valences (i.e.,
positive vs. negative), several studies have examined whether
emotions of the same valence categories elicit differential neural
activations. Against this background, the EBA and FBA present
such a preference for certain emotions. For example, Peelen et al.
(2007) showed that the EBA was modulated most effectively by
anger, disgust, and, to a lesser degree, fear. The EBA, however,
did not show increased activation in response to body movements
portraying sadness. The FBA showed a similar pattern. However,
fear and sadness both failed to elicit an increased response (Peelen
et al., 2007). In support of this, Pichon et al. (2009) identified the
FBA as being preferentially activated by anger compared to fear
or neutral body movements.
Peelen et al. (2010) applied a multivariate approach to
investigate whether neural patterns in the STS display emotion
specificity. They found that neural pattern within the STS
discriminated between different emotion categories, allowing
for a distinction between emotions such as anger, disgust, fear,
and sadness based on their neural patterns. This relatively new
method of fMRI data analysis reveals that not only overall activity
changes in brain regions but rather a more distributed response
pattern within one brain region indicate the response to observed
stimuli (Haxby et al., 2001; Haynes and Rees, 2005; Kriegeskorte
et al., 2008).
Regarding areas belonging to the AON, evidence is quite
sparse. Comparing anger and fear directly, the PMC, however,
also reveals a preferential activation for angry body motion
(Pichon et al., 2009).
Mentalizing-associated structures such as the TPJ show a
preferential activation for angry compared to fearful body motion
that becomes visible in the supramarginal TPJ. However, a reverse
pattern has been identified in the superior temporal part of the
TPJ, in which a greater response to fearful (vs. angry) stimuli was
elicited (Pichon et al., 2009). For the temporal pole, evidence is
also largely homogeneous.
Both studies that investigated emotion selectivity reported a
preferential activation in response to angry body movements
compared to fearful or neutral ones (Pichon et al., 2008, 2009).
The same holds true for frontal areas—that is, the dmPFC and
lOFC. Both structures have been identified as displaying a greater
BOLD response during the observation of angry compared to
fearful stimuli (Pichon et al., 2009). This finding is in line with the
results of multivariate analyses by Peelen et al. (2010) in which
the individual emotions (i.e., anger, disgust, fear, and sadness)
could be distinguished based on their activation patterns, thereby
indicating an “emotion specificity” in the mPFC.
Finally, the amygdala showed increased activation during
the observation of angry as well as happy body movements,
whereas movements displaying disgust, fear, and sadness (all
compared with neutral stimuli) had no effect (Peelen et al.,
2007). The authors suggested that this effect might be attributable
to low levels of arousal induced by disgust, fear, and sadness
compared to happiness and anger. Arousal dimensions have been
highlighted in the context of amygdala activation, indicating that
higher intensities correlate with higher activation magnitudes
(Anderson et al., 2003).
In sum, there is a clear trend toward preferential activation
in response to negative stimuli and, presumably, stimuli that
induce high levels of arousal. Such emotional modulation has
been postulated to originate in subcortical structures such as the
amygdala (Amaral et al., 2003). However, a combined continuous
theta burst stimulation (cTBS)-fMRI study by Engelen et al.
(2018) found that when regions belonging to the AON (i.e.,
PMC and IPL) were stimulated, activation of the amygdala
increased during the observation of threatening compared to
neutral stimuli. Without stimulation, amygdala activation did
not differ significantly between the two conditions. The authors
suggested that this effect could be attributable to functional
connectivity processes between the amygdala and structures of
the AON (Engelen et al., 2018). However, the exact circuits
and feedback processes have yet to be established. From an
evolutionary perspective, an argument in favor of a preferential
activation caused by threatening stimuli seems plausible, because
identifying negative emotions might be more relevant for the
organism so that it can quickly initiate a defense response.
However, it should be emphasized that multivariate studies are
more likely to shed light on whether certain structures produce
emotion-specific activations. Whereas emotions of the same
valence category may not elicit significantly different activation
magnitudes, they may well be represented within a different
pattern of activation (Peelen et al., 2010).
Task Specificity
Experimental Paradigms
A variety of task paradigms using different types of stimuli
and experimental instructions have been used to uncover the
neural basis of emotion perception. For instance, within explicit
observation paradigms, participants have been instructed to
observe a short video clip displaying emotional body movements.
In the next step, they are commonly asked to rate the video
sequence they have seen in terms of its valence (emotional vs.
neutral), or emotional intensity (e.g., “angry? 1: a little, 2: quite,
3: very much”), or make no judgment to ensure that the trials
of interest are not confounded by motor responses. In the latter
case, participants are instructed to press a button during control
stimuli trials (e.g., upside down, oddball) to control for their
attention.
Another popular method includes combined explicit and
implicit observation paradigms. Within experimental runs,
stimuli are blocked by task and alternate between series of explicit
and implicit recognition. During explicit conditions, participants
are asked to rate the emotion (e.g., fear/anger/neutral) displayed
in the video sequence. During implicit conditions, they observe
the same video sequences, but pay attention to colored dots or
video frames that appeared during the videos. Following the
sequence, participants are instructed to make a judgment about
the color (Pichon et al., 2009; Alaerts et al., 2013).
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Often, the implicit task condition serves merely as a control
task. However, it does allow an investigation of the brain areas
that may or may not be equally involved in conscious as well as
non-conscious emotion processing.
Task Effects on Neural Activity
The extensive neural network involved in the perception of
emotional body movements seems to be largely insensitive to
a reduction of the visual properties of the observed moving
stimulus. Nonetheless, modulatory effects regarding varying task
requirements (implicit vs. explicit paradigm) can be observed.
Structures that appear to be preferentially activated during
explicit emotion recognition include the pSTS and FBA (Pichon
et al., 2011; Atkinson et al., 2012; Alaerts et al., 2013). For
example, Alaerts et al. (2013) found that several regions,
including bilateral pSTS, were activated more strongly during
an explicit emotion recognition task compared to the implicit
processing of emotional content during the control task. Further
support stems from Atkinson et al. (2012) who directly compared
an explicit emotion judgment task with a color naming control
task. They also identified the pSTS as being more active during
the explicit task. Thus, the STS seems to play a substantial role
in the conscious perception of biological movement and dynamic
emotional expressions (Pichon et al., 2008; Van den Stock et al.,
2011).
Similarly, brain areas associated with mentalizing and ToM
processes, such as the dmPFC, lOFC, and TPJ, responded
preferentially during explicit emotion recognition (Sinke et al.,
2010; Pichon et al., 2011). This may highlight that mentalizing
processes are non-automatic and therefore require conscious
attention.
When considering AON-related areas, the IFG also responded
preferentially within explicit recognition trials across all study
designs (Sinke et al., 2010; Pichon et al., 2011), whereas the PMC
seemed to be equally responsive during both explicit and implicit
trials. In contrast to brain structures in which activity seems
to be modulated by explicit–implicit task demands, the PMC
appears to be independent from attention control. This notion
is underpinned in a study conducted by Van den Stock et al.
(2011). They reported activity in the PMC also during conscious
and non-conscious perception of emotions expressed via body
movements in a patient with cortical blindsight.
Pichon et al. (2011) reasoned that especially the PMC may
be involved in sustaining motor vigilance and also supporting
reflexive defensive behaviors. The authors interpreted this finding
as support for the view that emotions are essentially action
tendencies that help the organism to adapt to environmental
demands. Within this framework, recent evidence suggests that
these activations more probably reflect automatic preparation for
action (Pichon et al., 2008).
Two further structures are postulated to be involved in core
processes of emotion recognition such as decoding affective
significance and action preparation: the amygdala and the
hypothalamus. Both have been shown to respond equally
during attention and inattention (Pichon et al., 2011). In this
regard, an interesting study on a patient suffering from cortical
blindness (Van den Stock et al., 2011) investigated the neural
correlates of residual visual perception for dynamic whole-body
emotional actions that were presented in this patient’s intact and
blind visual hemifield. Activations specific for blind hemifield
presentation of angry compared with neutral actions were found
in subcortical areas (e.g., the amygdala), thereby showing a
selective involvement of these subcortical structures in non-
conscious visual emotion perception. This is underpinned by a
recent review from Diano et al. (2017) suggesting that evidence
tends to support an amygdala response during inattention.
However, they also emphasized that the results depend strongly
on the choice of paradigm. In fact, Van den Stock et al. (2011) also
reasoned that the absence of significant activity in the amygdala
during conscious perception of emotional movements does not
necessarily mean that the amygdala is not involved in conscious
processing, because standard fMRI methods might not be able to
make a fine-grained distinction of the possibly different temporal
profiles of activation occurring in various brain areas.
To summarize, the reviewed data show that the different
cortical and subcortical areas involved in the processing of
emotional body movements show a selective involvement in the
explicit or implicit processing of emotional body movements.
CONCLUSION
The present review demonstrates that a variety of brain areas are
involved in the perception and processing of emotional bodily
expressions, indicating that the human brain is well adjusted to
navigate in multiple emotional situations.
In general, it can be stated that all stimulus categories may
induce an emotional percept and are associated with increased
activation in a broad network of motor regions and/or in regions
associated with emotional processing. It can be stated further that
the emotional content of the moving stimuli matters. Thus, an
emotional stimulus seems to elicit an enhanced neural response
compared to a rather neutral one (Grèzes et al., 2007; Peelen et al.,
2007; Pichon et al., 2008). The respective neural network seems to
be organized around areas belonging to the so-called AON (PMC,
IFG, and IPL), to the mentalizing network (TPJ, TP, dmPFC,
and lOFC), and to areas processing body form and motion such
as the EBA, FBA, and pSTS. Furthermore, emotion-processing
brain sites such as the AMG and the hypothalamus seem to
play an important role during the observation of emotional
body expressions. For an overview of brain regions that are
preferentially recruited during emotional (vs. neutral) body
movements across all stimulus categories see Supplementary
Table 1.
Regarding the different stimulus qualities, it can be concluded
that both the perception and the associated neural activation
pattern are partly modulated by the stimulus category in the
following ways: (1) The observation of the most naturalistic
full-light displays is linked to increased activation in the most
extensive network including areas belonging to the AON (PMC,
IFG, and IPL), the mentalizing network (TPJ, TP, dmPFC,
and lOFC), body form and motion processing areas (EBA,
FBA, and pSTS), and emotion-processing areas (amygdala and
hypothalamus). (2) The observation of PLDs is associated
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specifically with increased activation in areas associated with
processing motor (IPL, IFG, and PMC) and body information
(EBA, FBA, and pSTS) as well as inferring mental states
and intentions (dmPFC, lOFC, and TPJ). Increased amygdala
activation, for example, was found only during the observation
of full-light displays and avatars, indicating that the impression
of animacy and body shape seems to have an increased impact
on areas associated with emotional processing. Moreover, studies
using PLDs and avatars did not report hypothalamus activation.
This may suggest that, perhaps due to the level of abstractness
or lack of realism, these stimulus categories do not elicit
a preparation for possible defensive behaviors. However, this
finding has to be viewed in light of the fact that all these
PLD and avatar studies also used predefined ROIs for their
analyses.
Regarding emotional valence, it is especially negative
emotional content (such as anger or threat) that seems to be
associated with increased activation of structures belonging
to several networks (i.e., the STS, PMC, TPJ, dmPFC, and
lOFC). This suggests that an adequate recognition as well as
an adequate response to those who are angry, threatening, or
dangerous may be of vital significance for self-protection and is
therefore processed preferentially. Another possibility introduced
by Peelen et al. (2010) is the idea that different emotions present
different neural patterns, because the identified regions contain
neurons that selectively represent emotion categories on an
abstract level. Finally, attention matters. Whereas the PMC, the
hypothalamus, and the amygdala have been shown to be equally
responsive during explicit and implicit tasks, other structures,
especially those associated with the mentalizing network (i.e.,
TPJ, dmPFC, and lOFC), respond only when participants have to
judge emotional content explicitly.
However, it has to be noted that future studies need to
investigate the different stimulus categories systematically within
one design, because the results presented here stem from
studies using a variety of designs, tasks, and statistics, and this
indubitably contributes to their diversity. A further issue is that
most studies used a priori defined search volumes. Therefore,
it remains unclear whether further brain sites might process
the observation and recognition of emotional body movements.
Finally, the studies presented here used mostly traditional forms
of fMRI data analysis that indicate only overall activity changes
in brain regions in response to the observed stimuli. Newer
approaches such as multivariate decoding (Haxby et al., 2001;
Haynes and Rees, 2005; Kriegeskorte et al., 2008) might allow
the investigation of the representational content of neuronal
population codes and the identification of more distributed
response patterns linked to a given stimulus. An increased usage
of these methods will certainly further our understanding.
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